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Abstract – This model explicitly incorporates the 
dynamic aspects of conservation programs with 
incomplete compliance and it allows landholders’ 
behaviour to change over time. We find that incomplete 
and instrument-specific enforcement can have a 
significant impact on the choice between subsidy 
schemes and reserves for conservation policies. The 
results suggest that it is useless to design a conservation 
scheme for landholders if the regulator is not prepared 
to explicitly back the program with a monitoring and 
enforcement policy. In general, the regulator will prefer 
to use compensation payments, if the cost of using 
government revenues is sufficiently low, the 
environmental benefits are equal, and the cost efficiency 
benefits exceed the (possible) increase in inspection 
costs. If the use of government funds is too costly, the 
reserve-type instruments will be socially beneficial. 
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For more than a decade some major European 
biodiversity policies, such as the Habitats and Birds 
Directives, have been in place. The two most relevant 
instruments used in the EU conservation policy are reserves 
and compensation payments for conservation practices. 
Imperfect monitoring and enforcement is proved to be an 
important factor in the practice of environmental regulation 
and it will be the focus of this contribution. Turning to 
conservation policies, [1] find that rule enforcement is a 
necessary condition to obtain successful outcomes from 
local resource management. However, in the academic 
literature little consideration is given to landholders’ actions 
once they have joined a conservation scheme. Therefore, in 
our model we allow landowners to imperfectly comply with 
a program’s requirements. The reason behind the imperfect 
compliance is that landholders’ actions cannot be directly 
observed and these actions can only be verified through 
costly monitoring, resulting in asymmetric information. 
Data also corroborate the assumption that compliance with 
currently implemented conservation schemes is less than 
perfect: see [2], [3], [4], and [5]. 
Previous models considering compliance to conservation 
programs, such as [2], [3] and [5], did so in a static 
framework while focusing on one policy instrument. Our 
model, however, explicitly incorporates the dynamic aspects 
of conservation programs and allows landholders’ 
behaviour to change over time. We also make a distinction 
between initial compliance and continuing compliance and 
focus on the difference in monitoring and enforcing 
compensation schemes or reserves. While most models 
assume that monitoring and enforcement strategies are 
independent of the type of instrument used, this assumption 
no longer holds when confronted with reality. As shown by 
[6], the type of environmental policy instrument dictates the 
characteristics and costs of the associated monitoring and 
enforcement strategy. Indeed, we find that incomplete and 
instrument-specific enforcement can have a significant 
impact on the selection of conservation instruments. The 
results suggest that it is useless to design a conservation 
scheme for landholders, if the regulator is not prepared to 
back the program with an appropriate monitoring and 
enforcement policy. In general, if the cost of using 
government revenues is sufficiently low and if the 
associated environmental benefits are similar, the regulator 
will prefer to use compensation payments over reserve-type 
instruments, if the reduction in total compliance costs   




We analyze a multi-period model with a finite horizon 
and assume that landholders are risk neutral. Landholders 
maximize the net benefit from their land. Initially none of 
these lands have been put to a conservation use. The start-
up cost of changing land use practices in order to enhance 
biodiversity for a landholder tend to be higher than 
continuing compliance costs because they include learning 
and conversion costs, changes in suppliers or fixed 
investment costs such as building fences or planting trees. 
Due to these cost differences, it is necessary to explicitly   2
distinguish between initial and continuing compliance. The 
costs of land conversion or of changing management 
practices vary between different landowners. We assume, 
furthermore, that the cost functions are commonly known to 
both government and landowners, but that only the 
landholders themselves know their real values.  
In order to implement a conservation policy the regulator 
chooses between two instruments: compensation payments 
and reserves. When reserves are used, this fixes the number 
of sites that have to take certain conservation measures. 
Compensation schemes determine a periodical payment for 
each landowner who implements a particular practice. 
The regulator is responsible for ensuring the landholders’ 
compliance with the policy and randomly performs 
inspections with positive probability in each period. Every 
audit entails costs and this inspection cost is high enough so 
that full compliance is not socially optimal. Further we 
assume that an inspection can perfectly determine the 
compliance status of the landowner. A violator who is 
caught has to pay a fine. The fine that can be imposed 
depends on the policy instrument used. For a compensation 
payment scheme, it cannot exceed the cumulative subsidy 
amounts since this would imply less (voluntary) 
participation by the target group. Thus, we assume that this 
fine is equal to the cumulative sum of all subsidies that were 
already paid to the violator in previous periods. The 
restitution of all subsidies received so far means that fines 
are increasing in time and thus deterrence is mounting over 
time. Furthermore, the sanction imposed on dissenting 
landholders also implies that the violators cannot receive 
any future subsidies. This is again a common feature of real 
life conservation practices. When a reserve-type instrument 
is chosen, the fine is exogenously fixed in the legislation. 
 
A. Compliance with compensation payments 
 
We distinguish three cases. In case I, it is always 
profitable for the landholders to implement the conservation 
measures even without compensation payments. Indeed the 
conservation costs are already covered by the increase in 
private land revenues (e.g. fewer fertilizers are needed) after 
implementation. Thus, the compliance decisions of these 
low-cost landowners are independent of the enforcement 
policy. The high-cost landowners in case III would always 
violate the program’s rules, if they would participate, since 
the costs of compliance are always higher than the highest 
possible fine that can be imposed, corrected for the change 
in land revenues. Even with perfect monitoring, it is not 
optimal for these landholders to comply. For medium-cost 
landowners (case II) the compliance decisions depend on 
the monitoring policy. The level of the probability of 
inspection has to be high enough to convince these 
landholders to fulfil the program’s requirements during the 
complete time horizon. If the monitoring stringency is not 
sufficiently high, these landowners will only execute the 
necessary management changes when the expected sanction 
is high enough. Due to the increasing fines, landholders 
decide to comply once the expected penalty exceeds a 
certain threshold. If the detection probability is too low, 
these owners never comply if they decide to participate. 
Once we know the compliance decisions of program 
participants, we can derive the conditions under which it is 
optimal for them to actually join the conservation program. 
The low-cost landholder opts to participate in the program 
under condition that the initial compliance cost is not too 
high. If the initial compliance cost is higher than the net 
present value of all future profits from the program, the land 
manager will not take part in the conservation scheme, even 
though he would implement the required land use practices 
once he would have been enrolled in the program. Once the 
initial compliance cost has been incurred, it can be treated 
as a sunk cost and thus only the (lower) continuous 
compliance costs are relevant for future compliance 
decisions. If the landowner would never comply with the 
program’s obligations, he would also opt not to take part in 
it, since the initial compliance cost is even higher than the 
cost of continuing compliance. If the monitoring policy is 
such that medium-cost landowners only start complying 
after a certain time, we find that these landowners will 
participate in the conservation program if their initial 
compliance costs are sufficiently low. 
 
B. Compliance with reserves 
 
When the regulator decides to use reserves as a policy 
instrument, the landholders in a particular region are legally 
obliged to implement certain conservation measures. A 
fixed percentage of plots need to be sustainably managed. 
The landowners who are targeted by the policy can choose 
to comply with the rules or not. With a probability p 
landowners are inspected and, when a violation is detected, 
the violator has to pay a fine and he is forced to comply in 
that period. Again it initially costs more to start 
implementing the required practices than to continue 
compliance with the regulation.  
The compliance behaviour of the landholders with a 
reserve instrument is described as follows. A low-cost 
landholder is always compliant, since implementing the 
conservation measures is less costly than paying the 
expected fine. Medium-cost owners will postpone initial 
compliance until the violation is detected and they are 
forced to incur the initial compliance costs. Afterwards, 
because continuing compliance costs are lower than initial 
compliance costs, they continue to adopt the mandated   3
conservation practices. The second group of medium-cost 
landowners start by complying with the policy in the first 
period because they can save paying the expected fine for 
one period (corrected for the change in private land 
revenues). The high-cost landholders never comply, since 
they find it less expensive to pay the expected fine(s) than 
to pay the compliance costs. 
 
III. CHOICE OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
 
Compensation payment schemes and reserves each have 
a different impact on welfare. The effect on environmental 
quality depends on the variation in conservation benefits 
over the different sites. Thus, we cannot draw any general 
conclusions about the relative effect of both instruments. If 
the regulator knows which plots are likely to provide higher 
conservation benefits, reserve schemes can be targeted 
toward those plots. This would imply that reserves can yield 
a higher environmental benefit than subsidy payments. The 
use of reserves in settings with high conservation benefits is 
indeed something we observe in reality. In a situation where 
a failure to act has irreversible consequences or where 
conservation is incompatible with human actions, reserves 
are probably the most appropriate instrument to use. 
Compensation schemes can be used, for instance, in an 
established agricultural landscape to stimulate conservation 
therein. To keep the analysis tractable, we assume, however, 
that the conservation benefits are uniform. This implies that 
both policies have exactly the same effect on the 
environmental quality since they both reach the policy 
target. The same situation would hold true if there is no 
information on the individual environmental benefits but 
only on the distribution of conservation benefits. The 
regulator would then assign the same expected benefit to 
conservation measures for each plot in the region. 
Total landholders’ revenues under a compensation 
scheme are always larger than under a reserve scheme. First, 
the landowners are compensated – at least in part – for their 
costs and, second, only the lowest cost landholders will 
participate in the program since subsidy schemes are cost-
efficient while reserve schemes are not. In order to rank the 
two policy instruments, we also need to consider their 
impact on government revenues. The compensation scheme 
will always cost the regulator more than a reserve policy, 
since subsidy payments as well as inspection costs increase. 
Depending on the cost of government resources, we 
distinguish two cases. If the compensation payments are 
costless transfers, compensation schemes will increase 
social welfare compared to reserves if the reduction in total 
compliance costs (cost efficiency) exceeds the increase in 
inspection costs. In the second case, government funds are 
costly to use because they are financed by distortionary 
taxes. Then the regulator will still prefer to use 
compensation payments if the marginal cost of public funds 
is sufficiently low and the higher inspection costs do not 
outweigh the cost-efficiency benefits. However, for a 
sufficiently high marginal cost of public funds, the use of 




This paper shows that incomplete enforcement guides the 
regulator’s choice between compensation schemes and 
reserve-type instruments. Compliance with regulations 
cannot be guaranteed without effort from the regulator and 
this has implications for the government budget. Monitoring 
and enforcement aspects should thus be more plainly 
incorporated in conservation policies and part of the 
programs’ budgets should be explicitly earmarked toward 
this end. Designing adequate monitoring and enforcement 
strategies is thus one of the upcoming challenges for 
European conservation policy. Our analysis shows that, if 
there is no information on the conservation benefits 
associated with each plot or if these benefits are equal 
across the region, the regulator will weigh the efficiency 
and enforcement benefits of compensation schemes with the 




I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the FWO project ‘An 
economic approach to modelling the enforcement of environmental 




1.  Gibson CC, Williams JT, Ostrom E (2005) Local enforcement and 
better forests. World Development 33(2):273-284 
2.  Choe C, Fraser I (1998) A note on imperfect monitoring of agri-
environmental policy. J Agric Econom 49(2):250-258 
3.  Choe C, Fraser I (1999) Compliance monitoring and agri-
environmental policy. J Agric Econom 50(3):468-487 
4.  Ellefson PV, Kilgore MA, Granskog JE (2007) Government 
regulation of forestry practices on private forest land in the United 
States: An assessment of state government responsibilities and 
program performance, Forest Policy Econom 9:620-632 
5.  Giannakas K, Kaplan JD (2005) Policy design and conservation 
compliance on highly erodible lands. Land Econom 81(1):20-33 
6.  Rousseau S, Proost S (2005) Comparing environmental policy 
instruments in the presence of imperfect compliance – A case study, 
Environ Resource Econom 32(3):337-365 
 
Author: Sandra Rousseau 
Institute: Center of Economic Studies, K.U.Leuven 
Street: Naamsestraat 69 
City: B-3000 Leuven 
Country: Belgium 
Email: sandra.rousseau@econ.kuleuven.be  